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SUN{N'lARY.
THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH.
A theolo gical re seareh.
The concept of truth has been made more ,and more subjective and relative
in the Western train of thinking, so that lve can speak of a crisis of the idea
of truth. On thc other halrd there are numerous efforts nowadays to under-
stand the meaning of truth in a ner,v way. Thcology is interested in these
things too. It has always upheld, that God's salvation of man is truth at the
same time. Moreover theology ought to occupv itself with the idea of truth,
because it cannot take this fundamental idea as a datum from other scicnces,
no more than e.g. the ideas ,, love", ,, justice", , i i fe", etc. If i t did so, it would
be uncritical and lose its autonomy. For this reason theology is compelled to
account for its idea of truth independently.
In the Netherlands it was J. H. Cunning, who, already in a previous gene-
ration, had an open eye for the great importance of understanding the idea of
truth from presuppositions of theology itself. Of to day's theologians E. Brun-
ner has devoted a separate study to the christian understanding of truth. His
book Wahrkeit als Begegnung (1938) has become well known in many
countries.
The first chapter of this study offers a historical orientation. It will also give
the necessary relief to the then following, more specific theological con-
siderations. We trace here, what in various phases of our Western tradition
the idea of truth has been considered to be. For that purpose we have chosen
as much as possible some representative thinkers and referred to their most
characteristic views in this matter. We have not attempted to be complete
here. This historical vicw shows that the idea of truth is not a formal .on."pt,
but is connected with the content of truth, which man lives by.
The christian theologian finds the norm of this truth expressed in Holy
Scrir:ture. Therefore in the second chapter the biblical foundation of the
conccpt of truth is sought. We do this iy f inding out the meaning of the
words'entet and aldtheia in the Old- and New Testament. In the Israelitic
idea emet 1,ire meet, in respect of thc Greek-\rVestern tradition, a remarkably
di{ferent approximation of the idea of truth. The Greek-Western tradition
starts from thc meaning o[ aletheia as disclosure, as being open to be knolvn.
On the other hand emet has the fundamental meaning of firmness, which
primarily is not concerned r,r,ith the cognitive relation, but with ,,being
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together". Emet had its proper place and function in the community of
p"".ronr, expressed in the israelitiC manner of thinking: in the.relation of the
lovenant (ierith\. The Old Testamcnt does not contain the abstract truth as
objective accordance between ,,thinking" 
-and ,,being"' Emet includes much
more than only the intellectual relation. It indicates the communal relation
in the midst of lif". It mcans the totality of conduct in which people can rely
upon each other and in which they act according to u,hat may be expected of
th"rrr. E-et is more than only truth and veracity, so far as these express
inclination, namely also the Power to convelt this inclination into deeds.
Truth rvithout pragmatic effect is no real truth. In religious language emet
expresses the firmn"ess of the covenant bctvveen Yahweh and his people. This
firmness consists in thc faith and actualisation, with which the covenant is
kept from both sides.
Of matters too it can be said that they are emet. This matter-truth is tfien
understood by the Israelite from the truth of covenant. Behind the matter-
realitv stands the God of the cot'enant. Therefore emet is always concerned
with ihe responsibility o[ the entire Person. That is why it can also qualify
,,knolying" 
".rd ,,.p"uli.rg". 
The emet of the spoken vyord is the,emet of the
,p"nk., in hi, ,p""t i"g. vlth this agrees- that emet in the old Testament
fi.-, ^ co*plete pair ivith chesed and sedaela nd is often translated in the
Septuagint by th" words pisfis and dikaiosund. With the covenant-sense of,
"-et 
it!'cha.acter of will and action is connected. Time after time ,,to do the
truth" is spoken of. From this expression it is clear, that emet is no timeless
quality; it ls a historical happening. As maintenance of the community emet
has the consrant property of realising itself in t ime. In the religious_sphere
emet is the victoribus, sovereign porver of history and so object of supplication
and hope, confidence and gladness'
In analysine the word aletheia in the New Testament it appear-s, that its
meaning go", i".k to two different roots, namely to that of the Greck aletheia
as being np"t to be knorvn and to that of the Hebrew emet as maintenance
of thc 
-co-*unity. 
These two diffcrent meanings do not remain sePalate
from each ot|cr in the Nerv Testament aletheia, but form a nerv unity here.
This happens in this sense, that the-cognitive being open of the Gleek
aletheia tl.o-", a subordinate but real moment in the whole dominated by
the euret as personal community-relatigl. Indeed there has taken place a
change in the relation between the Old Testament emet and the New Testa-
ment"aletheia, something new has been added to it. Yet this new element
forms a continuity with the old. We have come to an other conclusion here
than e.q. Martin Buber, according to 
-wh.o1n there yawns a wide insuperable
g"p b.i*""n the Old Testament and old christian concePtion of religious
truth.
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The new thing in the meaning of aletheia in the New Testament is, that
the emet as mutual maintenance of the covenant between God and man,
which is broken by man's unfaithfulness and falsehood, is kept by God in
Jesus Christ and is re-established also from the side of man in Him. According
to the New Testamcnt Jesus Christ is the truth. He is the ,,Amen", in whom
the covenant between God and man and between man and God finds its con-
firmation and existencc. Thc community of truth between man and God and
befween man and man is rc-vealed in Jesus Christ as resting in the commu-
nity of tmth, lvhich God maintains with man. It is connecred with the
historical manifestation of God's emet in Jesus Christ, that the New Testa-
ment aletheia has a greater margin of objectivity and clearness than the Old
Testament emet. God's emet, shown formerly in the escape from Egypt, has
now been realized in a much clearer way and has become present in his
action in Jesus Christ, in his life, death and resurrection. lqually the Greek
q"1l]ty of aletheia as being open to intellectual knowing has become greater
in New Testament truth than in OId Testamenr emer.
The exegesis of the scriptural words emet and aletheia indicates and founds
the idea of truth, it does not yet unfold it. In the third chapter therefore
follows a more detailed reflection upon the concept of truth fr-om the view-
point of systematic theology. We point out the correspondence between the
concept of revelation and the concept of truth. Here we are confirmed in the
conviction, that the Greek-Thomistic idea of truth does not fully match the
christian understanding of revelation. The Greek-Thomistic structure of
truth involuntarily changes the biblical revelation-relation of a personal I-
You-relation in an impersonal I- it-relation.
E. Brunner has indicated with his characterization of the truth as
,,meeting", i.e. as personal community, an important element of the christian
idea of truth. The essential trait, however, that the biblical truth is the
fl'aintettatrce of this community, is lacking. We ascribe this to the fact that
Brunner omitted the cxegetical analysis of the words emet and aletheia.
Our second objection to Brunner's bookWahrheit aLs Begegnungis, that he
does not give the historical reality of the rruth of Christ that ionstitutive
place, rvhich lve think that is due to it. Jesus Christ is not only the utay to
the trutlr, IJe is also its essence. He is thc ,,meeting" of God a.rd man p"r-
sonally. our third objection to Brunner's explanation is that he does noi .lo
sufficient justice to the charactcr of the truth of christian doctrine. According
to ou.r 'ieu' the cogniti'e element of truth as a matter of knowledge anl
doctrine is a subordinate, but also a rcal element ir-r the entire structurJof the
christian truth as a matter of community.
Premising, that the truth is not absorbed in anv undersranding or definition
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of it, we venture to formulate the essence of truth in this way: truth is God's
self-maintenance in his communication of self and His communication of
self in his self-maintenance in Jesus Christ.
After accounting for the essence of truth we distinguish, in accordance
with the munus triplex of Christ, three essential modi of truth. The first is
the priestly -ode ol truth. It is truth as cunmanication of self , as love and
solidarity, as mutual ,,nnder-standing", in which I become ,,sub-stance" in
relation to the other and the other in relation to me. The second is the royal
mode of truth. Here the stress is laid on the maintaining character of ruth
in its communication of self, on truth as Christ's basileia. Truth is what has
effect and gives stability to man. Here honour is due to those moments in
which pragmatism is right. As the priestly character gives truth the quality of
confidence and inner freedom, so its royal character gives the quality of
authority and obedience to tmth. The third mode of truth we call the
prophetic. Acting as priest and king - not apart from it - Christ is the truth
too as the witness, the teacher and the Word of God, who discloses the
secrecy of the kingdom of God. This cognitive, prophetic side of the truth
fulfils an indispensable, medial function in the entirety of truth. Only by
way of knowledge, that separates and connects, is spiritual community
between persons possible. Otherwise this would get the character of physical,
magic confluence and compulsion. Only by the intermediacy of knowing,
persons can make decisions rvith regard to each other in freedom and can
converse with each other in the relation of real authority. Truth as personal
community-relation implies the cognitive truth as objective accordance with
reality. Truth is not only defined existentially and subjectively. This one-
sidedness of Kierkegaard and many others to-day cannot be maintained.
Finally among the many ,,truths", which surround us and cause internal
dissensions, we try to take seriously the unity of rruth, which we believe to
be in Jesus Christ. Here we answer the objections Karl Jaspers raises against
this ,,catholicity" of truth. We think it necessary to-day, that theology should
point to the prospect of the reintegration of our divergent rruths in that one
total truth, of which the heart of the christian religion gives evidence. On the
basis of some examples r,r'e give an impression of the manner in which in our




De traditionele opvatting clcr waarheid
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De fundamentalistische wijze van hand
een onschriftuurlijk waarheidsbegrip.
II]
De zienswijze ,,dasz der Glaube als 1
(H. van Oyen, TheoloEsche Erkcnntn
belemmert het rechte begrip der bijbek
n
De existentialistische waarheidsopvattir
waarheid van het christelilk geloof.
v
E. Brunners typering van de christeliik
doet te kort aan de objectieve en aan
waarheid.
V
In art. X van de Kerkorde der Nedeila,
gcmeenschap met' en niet ,, in overet
moet zich echter laten bewiizen uit eer
